University of Texas
at Brownsville
History
of Browsville and Matamoros
Professor Knopp
The Chamizal Dispute
By Carlos Martinez
Introduction
For 1200
miles from the Gulf of Mexico to El Paso, the United States and Mexico share
the Rio Grande as a boundary. Under the 1848 treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and
the Gadsen treaty in 1853, the center of the deepest channel constitutes the
dividing line. However, because of the
meandering nature of the river, innumerable land changes have taken place.
Although some were caused by erosion and accretion others were as a direct
result of changes in the river’s course.
Even
before 1905 many cases arising from the river’s shifting course have focused
over jurisdiction of the Bancos, San Elizario and Morteritos Islands. Some
of these legal battles included cattle seizure, wing dam and fence
construction, the Brownsville Wharf, water diversion by the American Rio Grande
Land and Irrigation Company which eventually led to the Chamizal dispute.
In trying
to standardize the practice followed in determining the boundary line, the
United States and Mexico signed the treaty of 1884 and in 1889 established the
international Boundary Commission (later the International Boundary and Water
Commission) to administer the treaty rules. However, Bancos formed by
tracts of land separated form either country by a cutoff became such a problem
that a special treaty had to be negotiated to exclude them form the effects of
the Treaty of 1884.
Under the
treaty (Between U.S. and Mexico for the elimination of the Bancos in the Rio
Grande from the effects of Article II of the treaty of November 12, 1884)
signed on March 20, 1905 there was a provision which called for any Bancos that
formed on the right bank of the river be under the dominion and jurisdiction of
Mexico. Also under this same provision those that formed on the left bank were
to be under U.S jurisdiction. Exempted from this rule of law were Bancos
with an area of more than 250 hectares or a population of more than 200 people.
Eventually this treaty affected 215 Bancos.
The Rio Grande Rectification Project straightened out the river from the Cordova Island to Box Canyon stabilizing the boundary by providing additional floor control which helped prevent future detachment of land from one country to another. Water apportionment and flood control have been major problems along the Rio Grande boundary. However, both countries have taken measures to address this problem
The Rio
Grande forms at the glaciated San Juan Mountains of southwestern Colorado and
flows south through a series of structural basins some 650 miles from El Paso.
Starting at El Paso the river becomes the international boundary between the US
and Mexico. The Rio Grande runs along a 1,250 miles corridor draining into the
Gulf of Mexico near Brownsville, Texas.
The
president of Mexico, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, defined El Chamizal as a jirón del
territorio nacional. (Novedades newspaper
July 18, 1963.)
The map shows below the Chamizal’s area around 1860’s
The current map of the Chamizal’s area
As expected, Mexico’s reaction to dispute was
entirely different than in the US. Many political critics “described how
difficult it was for the people to understand the Chamizal dispute”.
In Calleros Cleofas, El chamisal : Que es?, he describes the Mexican
landowners prior to the dispute. In 1827, a Mexican citizen obtained title to
the area that includes the Chamizal and upon his death in 1866; the
tract was willed to his grandson Pedro Garcia. Nearly thirty years later, in
1895, Garcia placed a formal compliant with the Mexican boundary commissioner
over jurisdiction of the Chamizal.
Antonio Luna Arrollo, Author of El
Chamizal ya es Mexicano, mention Garcia was familiar
with the Treaty of 1884. He claimed that the tract was formed by an “ abrupt
and sudden change of current” which in 1873 severed the tract
from Mexico and attached it to the south of El Paso.
Lic.
Salvador Mendoza, in his book El Chamizal: un drama Judirico e Historico,
explains why the commissioners had little difficulty accepting the problem as
one within their jurisdiction and to be solved in accordance with the treaties
of 1884 and 1889. The report of the Mexican consulting engineer in 1896
concluded that the river had abandoned its Emory-Salazar channel already in
1852, not in 1873 as implied by Garcia’s statement.
Calleros also talks about testimonials of some key protagonists. Some of this court witnesses introduced by Don Garcia included: Jesus Serna, Antonio Velarde, Gregorio Herrera, Jose Provencio, Matias Velarde, Francisco Provencio, Jose Acosta, and doctor Mariano Samaniego. Residents both of the Paso and of Juarez confirmed that the little or no change occurred in the channel’s position from 1852-1964; rapid changes accompanied large floods from 1864-1868; little or no change occurred after 1868. Taking into account the fact that the river had little or no flow during half of the year; the rate of bank erosion during periods of actual flow was equivalent to approximately 560 meters per year, or nearly five feet per day.
In Texas,
the US government appointed Commissioner Anson Mills to settle the dispute
between the two governments. In Jerry E Muller, Restless River, the author
describes in detail about how US commissioner, Anson Mills, argued that there
was not sufficient physical evidence to prove that the entire shift was due to
erosion. However, trough the year’s maps were not available to show the
channel’s position during the 1860’s and 1870’s.
Without
reaching an agreement the commissioner sent reports of their findings, to the
government, and recorded their views in a joint journal.
In
J.J. Bowden, The Ponce de Leon Land Grant, he explains why Mr. Mills
refused the opinion of the seven witnesses before the commission who testified
that the river had never overflowed its banks in the Chamizal area;
hence, how was it possible for a new channel to be cut, and for one to be
abandoned? Therefore, he applied the term erosion as it was defined in the
treaty of 1884 and accordingly dismissed it as the process responsible for the Chamizal. He regarded the fluvial boundary as mobile
and in a state of constant flux, with a permanent boundary line established
only when doubt exist as to jurisdiction and channel changes along a boundary.
Politically it was of extreme importance for both parties to keep the river as
their natural boundary.
In Gladys Gregory, The Chamizal
Settlement a View From El Paso, he cites how commissioner Mills, in an
obvious attempt to strengthen the position of the United States tries to weaken the
Mexican contention of rapid erosion by emphasizing the average annual shift of
the river between 1852 and 1895. Mexico claimed that “ slow and gradual” refers
to the rate process (erosion), while Mills argues that “slow and gradual”
refers to the long-term effect of process.
In
Jerry E Muller, Restless River, he describes the opinion of Mr. Caleb
Cushing In terms of the treaty of 1884.
Based on Mr. Cushing’s 1856 opinion, the contracting views of the
commissioners in the Chamizal controversy cannot be faulted. The treaty
of 1884 has provisions related only to the extremes in progress of the channel
change, rather than to the full range in the process. Mexican commissioner, Fernando Beltran y Puga, assumed that since
the treaty of 1884 mentions a boundary shift only in conjunction with a “slow
and gradual” channel shift, no other type of channel change could affect the
boundary.
The
Ponce De Leon Grant, Southwestern Studies, Volume VI number 4, mention
the year of 1896 as the date when the unsettled Chamizal case was closed
in order that the commission might move ahead with others cases and complaints.
A year later both commissioners asked their governments to reopen and resolve
the Chamizal dispute because of its interference with the bridge
construction between El Paso and Juarez. They also suggested at the
International Boundary Commission that a third commissioner be added to serve
as an arbitral member. The decision of the commission was to be final and
conclusive upon both governments. Later, Eugene Lafleur, a Canadian professor
of international law, was chosen as the third member to form the arbitral
board.
At
the beginning the U.S. agreed but Mexico refused. Therefore, the Mexican
Government refused to be bound by the decision of foreign commissioner, Eugene
Lafleur, who “could be nothing more than private individual” (Chamizal,
U.S. appendix, 1911: 347-53). After an exchange of rejected proposals on how to
add an arbiter, the commission dropped Chamizal from negotiation in
1898.
Strained
U.S. Mexican relations during the following decade negated reasonable offers
made by both sides. President Francisco Madero, successor to Diaz, offered to
exchange the Chamizal for the Island of San Elizario in the EL
Paso-Juarez Valley and Beaver Island (Monteritos) on the Lower Rio Grande.
However, United States President Woodrow Wilson refused to negotiate. In 1913
the U.S. offered the bar of El Horcon in exchange for Chamizal and
Cordova.
This proposal was very similar to the 1908 Mexican proposal, except that the United States excluded the Island of San Elizario, which Mexico refused to recognize under the new regime of General Adolfo de la Huerta, who subsequently withdrew Chamizal from negotiation.
The return of the Chamizal brought political
windfalls to Mexico
Mexican
political parties played an important role during the Chamizal dispute.
In Antonio Luna Arrollo, El Chamizal ya es Mexicano, he state the
history of Mexican citizens who lived in 1963. They considered Lopez Mateos,
president of Mexico, a national hero because he was the man responsible for
recovering a piece of the National Patrimony. In a national speech, after the
dispute was finalized, Lopez Mateos said:
“A long history ended- after 99 years of dispute- with a clear
victory for the law and morals of the Mexican people”.
According
with the author of the national newspaper, July 19, 1963, said “El señor
presidente hizo el milagro de que un jirón del territorio nacional volviera al
seno de la patria, el siguió los luminosos senderos del Benemérito de las
Américas, Don Benito Juárez”.
The
Chamizal did not receive widespread publicity again until 1962. The
issue arose in June 1962 at a meeting in Mexico City between President Kennedy
and the Mexican President Mateos. Kennedy, eager to bolster the United States
image in the organization of American States and the Alliance for progress,
came to regard the United States 1911 Award rejection as a black mark in his
country’s foreign relations.
The circumstances
referred to by Kennedy included the resettlement of 3,700 United States
Citizens in the affected zone and compensation of these people for land and
improvements valued at approximately 20 millions dollars. In August 1963 the Chamizal
Treaty was signed.
However, the United
States refused to transfer a number of areas in the northern portion of the 437
acres tract, which had become highly developed. A compromise was reached
where-by Mexico would receive 366 Chamizal acres, plus additional 71
acres to be cut from the United States just east of Cordova Island, in return,
Mexico relinquished its claim to north Chamizal.

The map shows the Chamizal’s resolution between
Mexico and U.S.
Each
country was eager to retain the river as boundary and to have all its territory
on one side of the channel. This was impossible as long as the 396acre Cordova
tract (Mexican) remained north of the river. Mexico gave-up the northern half
of Cordova (193 acres) to the United States in exchange for a similar acreage
cut form the United States to the east of Cordova to balance the 193 acres
Mexico lost from Cordova and the 71 acres Mexico relinquished in North Chamizal.
It is interesting that the Chamizal is considerably longer than the
natural channel. The permanent international boundary established by the
commission was to be the middle of the new Chamizal channel.
The
reaction of Mexico to the Chamizal settlement was enthusiastic. The
official position of the U.S Department of State is that the Chamizal
settlement represents United States good faith and adherence to awards made
through binding international arbitration. Reaction in El Paso and Texas was
generally favorable, although Senator Tower questioned the right of the federal
government to give-up territory without consent of that state’s legislature.
In order to
implement the Chamizal Treaty, it was necessary for the United States
Government to purchase 743.54 acres of land, or slightly more than a square
mile, of south El Paso. Nearly 85 % of
this area, 630.38 acres, was transferred directly to Mexico in the fall of
1967. The remaining 15 percent, 113.16 acres, was required for the Chamizal
Channel, a port of entry, relocation of the Texas and Pacific, Santa Fe, and
Southern Pacific railroads, and the relocation of the principal irrigation
canal. The property acquisitions alone cost the United States more than 27
millions dollars.
Mexican opinion after the dispute
Mexican opinion varied from a quiet victory amongst
the political elite to an outright euphoria amongst the working class. From a
political point of view victories over U.S interests have been few and far
between. Therefore, when the law sided with Mexico Adolfo Lopez Mateos seized
the moment to promote reform rather than to celebrate a hard fought victory.
The headlines in the weekly Siempre from July 19, 1963, read, “A
partir de hoy ningun pais por poderoso que sea volvera a humillar a Mexico” (from now on no country regardless of their
power will ever humiliate Mexico). As in years past Mexico did not celebrate
long for fear that somehow this triumph was going to be taken back by their
powerful neighbors. When the truth was that taking back the Chamizal was
more of a trade-off than a full recovery. Politicos in Mexico made sure
that their constituents only know of the recovery of the Chamizal rather
than the knowing that the U.S dictated the terms under which a deal could be
struck. However, the opinion of the working class was another mater altogether.
They believed that this victory should be celebrated by hurling insults at the
U.S as its customary. Ironically it seemed that this was payback for the failed
Brazero program an even the loss of territory during the Mexican war.
Sadly the victory was short lived because the recovery of the Chamizal
did not lead to benefits for the people as was promised by the government. Yet,
this was expected.
American opinion after the dispute
In July 16th, 1963 El universal, a Mexican daily, published an interview with several members of the III Inter-American congress and they all agreed that they were satisfied that the Chamizal issue was finally tabled for resolution because it was a case the U.S was obliged to resolve. They also agreed that it was a great gesture on Kennedy’s part because it would solidify U.S / Mexico relations. The U.S attorney general Robert Kennedy handpicked the delegates that were to attend this congress on the basis of their progressive thinking towards Latin American countries and their heritage. The American delegates interviewed were: Justice for the state of N.Y, Manuel Gomez; Denver Municipal court judge, Juan Sanchez; L.A Municipal court judge, Leopoldo Sanchez; Tucson Superior court judge, Raul Castro; Tampa judge, Manuel Garcia; Santa Fe, New Mexico, Samuel Montoya; Carlos McCormick, Washington expert on Latin American policy. The whole delegation unanimously agreed that American policy towards Mexico had changed dramatically over the last decade and they cited the favorable solution to the Chamizal as clear proof of this. El Paso mayor, Judson F. Williams, stated that the resolution of the dispute would greatly enhance relations with Ciudad Juarez. Furthermore, he believed that Mexican citizens involved in the dispute should be compensated for the years that they couldn’t use their land. However he was confident that the dispute did not really have the negative impact that the newspapers led you to believe.